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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A- LOWER COURT. 
The lower court had jurisdiction over this proceeding 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3a-17, (1984) as amended. 
B. THIS COURT. 
This court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(h) (1984) as amended. The final 
judgment below was entered the 30th day of August, 1990. Appellant 
filed his notice of appeal on the 6th day of September, 1990, 
pursuant to R.C.A. 3(a). The Court of Appeals moved for its own 
notice of summary disposition. Both parties filed memoranda in 
response to the court's notice. On the 5th day of December, 1990, 
this court ordered that summary disposition was inappropriate and 
all issues raised therein were reserved for plenary presentation 
and consideration of the case. 
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III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A. The trial court did not apply the proper test in arriving 
at its decision to not modify the decree of divorce. 
B. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that 
there had not been any material and substantial change in 
circumstances since the entry of the decree of divorce. 
C. The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to 
respondent. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated, (1984) as amended, 
is believed to be determinative in the above issues. It provides 
as follows: 
(1) ..."In determining custody, the court shall consider 
the best interests of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The court may 
inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's 
desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody 
otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among 
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely 
to act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the 
child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent 
as the court finds appropriate. 
Section 30-3-10.1 Utah Code Annotated, (1984) as 
amended, defines "Joint Legal Custody" as: 
(1) ... sharing the rights, privileges, duties, and 
powers of a parent by both parents where specified; 
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(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying one 
parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the primary 
residence of the child. 
Section 30-3-10.4 Utah Code Annotated, (1984) 
establishes how the original custody award can be modified or 
terminated: 
(l)(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both 
custodians have materially and substantially changed since the 
entry of the order to be modified, or the order has become 
unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the 
decree would be an improvement for and in the best interest of the 
child." 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (1984) as 
amended. 
(See Addendum) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Douglas R. Crouse, was divorced from 
respondent, Audrey Crouse, on or about June 1, 1987, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The divorce was a default proceeding, and the matter 
of custody was never adjudicated before by the court. The parties 
stipulated to joint custody for the two minor children, Tosha R. 
Crouse, born June 26, 19 84, and Brandon D. Crouse, born September 
9, 1985. Kim Peterson, a licensed social worker, performed a 
custody evaluation and determined that joint legal custody would 
be appropriate and should be awarded, with the primary physical 
custody to be with the respondent. The children, however, have 
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spent nearly equal time with both parties, approximately six months 
of each year in each home. The appellant desires to modify the 
decree of divorce to allow him to have the physical care and 
custody of the parties' minor children so that they can attend 
school in Magna to avoid the long bus rides presently required. 
Additionally, a change in physical custody would give Brandon the 
opportunity of obtaining speech therapy for his speech impediment, 
through a special school program. Finally, the physical safety of 
the children is at issue and evidence to that issue was placed 
before the court. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This initial divorce proceeding was filed March 31, 1987, 
in Third District Court. The parties were divorced on June 1, 
1988. The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, heard the matter as Judge Pro Tern in the second of 
two Pre-Trial conferences between the parties. (Decree of Divorce, 
dated June 1, 19 88, Exhibit "E" in Addendum hereto). 
Both parties were represented by counsel. An initial 
custody evaluation was performed by Kim Peterson, which recommended 
Joint Legal Custody with the physical custody to be with the 
respondent, primarily, the appellant alleges, because of the tender 
ages of the minor children, and because the appellant lived in a 
small apartment. Mr. Peterson made specific recommendations in his 
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evaluation for changes to be made in the home and yard of the 
respondent to ensure the safety of the minor children. A 
stipulation was reached between the parties. Appellant obtained 
the divorce on a default basis, the parties stipulating to joint 
custody for the two minor children, Tosha R. Crouse, who was then 
four years old, and Brandon D. Crouse, who was then two years old. 
The respondent was to have physical custody of the minor children, 
and the matter of custody was never adjudicated by the court. 
(Decree of Divorce, Exhibit "E" in Addendum hereto) 
Appellant filed a Modification of Decree of Divorce on 
the 15th day of June, 1989. (Petition for Modification of Decree 
of Divorce, June 15, 19 89, Exhibit "F" in Addendum hereto) 
A Pre-Trial Settlement Hearing was heard on the 6th day 
of October, 1989. The court appointed Dr. Gary Taylor to perform 
a custody evaluation. A second Pre-Trial Settlement Hearing was 
heard on the 13th day of June, 19 90, and the case was set for 
trial. The case came on for trial before the Honorable Judge 
Kenneth Rigtrup on the 27th day of July, 1990. 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE COURT BELOW 
The court denied the appellant's motion to modify the 
decree of divorce based on the court's opinion that there was no 
material or substantial change in circumstance. (Tr. p. 127-128, 
Exhibit "H" in Addendum hereto, and heretofore referred to as"Tr.") 
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The Court therefore would not consider any evidence which pertained 
to the best interests of the children. The Court ordered the 
appellant to pay $2,500 for the respondent's attorney fees, 
indicating that it was awarded as a sanction according to Rule 11. 
(Tr. 133, Order and Judgment, dated August 30, 1990, Exhibit "G" 
in Addendum hereto) 
D. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The appellant alleged that since the time the divorce 
decree was entered, substantial changes have occurred between the 
parties as follows: 
a. The plaintiff moved from a small apartment into 
a home which he is purchasing. The home has three bedrooms, a 
completely fenced in yard, and is located in a neighborhood with 
sidewalks. (Tr. p. 7-8, 105) 
b. Recently, appellant has had the children reside 
at his residence almost fifty percent of the time. The children 
now spend almost as much time with the appellant as with the 
respondent. (Tr. p. 13, Affidavit of Douglas Crouse) This was not 
the case initially. 
c. After the divorce, appellant noticed the 
children's physical condition worsen. They became unkempt and 
dirty. Appellant has found that the children have been 
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increasingly sick with colds and flu, etc., when they come from 
respondent's home. (Tr. p. 14-15, 18, 19) 
d. Appellant has become concerned for the 
education of the children. This has become increasingly a primary 
consideration. The children were not attending school at the time 
of the divorce and they both are presently doing so. Appellant 
had not considered poor access to the schools with the children 
living in Scofield, or the excessive amount of travel time required 
to get to school. As a result of the children living in Scofield, 
Utah, during the school year and the distant location of the 
elementary school, Tosha is bused 3 hours each day, one and one-
half hours one-way. Since Tosha is in kindergarten, she must wait 
half of the day in the library because the bus only runs once in 
the morning and once in the evening to Scofield. (Tr. p. 19) 
Brandon, age 5, attends pre-school in Helper, Utah, but 
in the winter months, the conditions of the roads have been too 
precarious to transport him there. (Tr. p. 19, 69-70) 
e. Brandon has a speech impediment and is in need 
of speech therapy on an ongoing basis, which could be provided for 
him in Salt Lake or the Magna schools. (Tr. p. 16, 23, 54, 103) 
As a result of the fact that he will be soon be going to 
kindergarten, there is a more pressing need for speech therapy to 
begin and to continue on an ongoing basis. 
7 
f. The evidence showed that appellant Douglas 
Crouse is competent and capable of assuming the physical custody 
of the minor children. The appellant's income is adequate in that 
he earns $2,000.00 per month. (Tr. p. 9). He now resides in a 
brick home in a subdivision with a completely fenced back yard, 
complete with grass and flowers, (Tr. p. 7). Fruit trees grow in 
the yard. An elementary school is within one and one half blocks 
of this residential home. (Tr. p. 8) The appellant is a good 
housekeeper. He has a washer and dryer, (Tr. P. 9). 
g. The court heard testimony that the respondent 
worked part-time, two to three mornings per week, for four hours, 
with the wage of $4.50 per hour. (Tr. p. 65, 97) However, the 
respondent also is supported by her common law husband, who 
testified that his gross income is $85,000 to $90,000 per year, 
before business expenses. (Tr. p. 132-133). No other evidence of 
his income was introduced. 
2. At the time of the divorce appellant had concerns 
about respondent's residence, in regards to the safety of the 
children. The home of the respondent is a converted metal 
warehouse, which is situated very closely to a four lane highway 
and train tracks. The yard in which the home is situated is 
unsafe. It is a construction yard with abandoned heavy equipment 
and gas tanks. (Tr. p. 20, 44) Appellant's living situation was 
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also less than ideal at the time of the divorce. The appellant was 
living in a two bedroom apartment. Appellant moved into a home 
after the divorce. It was appellant's understanding that 
material improvements in the living conditions of the respondent's 
home, for the protection of the children would take place, namely, 
a fence should be constructed for a safe play area, the diesel pump 
should be removed, and an outside access to a bedroom upstairs 
should be built. (Kim Peterson's Custody Evaluation in Court file; 
Tr. p. 21, 35-36) 
At the time of the divorce, appellant believed 
erroneously that the improvements were part of the divorce 
procedure and later realized the respondent was under no legal duty 
to make the specified improvements. Many of these changes were 
not made until several months after appellant's petition to modify 
the decree of divorce was filed. (Tr. p. 22, 74, 121) A fence has 
been erected, and the diesel pump has been removed, but there is 
still no access to the upstairs bedrooms except through the 
shop/garage area, where there are many dangerous tools. Although 
the parties' minor children do not have their bedrooms upstairs, 
they do go up to the upstairs bedrooms to play. (Tr. p.45, 68, 70). 
3- Respondent lives with her former husband, Doug 
Trease, and they have not legally remarried. Since the divorce, 
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one additional child has been born to respondent, with Mr. Doug 
Trease being the natural father. (Tr. p. 63) 
4. Appellant has been informed that the Department of 
Family Services had investigated allegations of child neglect and 
possible sexual abuse in the home of defendant. (Tr. p. 46, 47, 
57, 76, 80, 90, 93) This was an additional new circumstance 
occurring after the time of the initial divorce. 
5. A new custody evaluation was performed for the 
Modification Action wherein the evaluator, Dr. Gary Taylor, 
recommended that although the children love both parents and are 
bonded to both parents, that physical custody should be changed to 
appellant, due to his concerns about what is best for the children 
and "what can benefit the children most." (Tr. p. 49) 
He found that the appellant's housing was definitely a 
better and safer living environment. He felt that the appellant 
would be very likely to give the children the kind of medical 
attention they need. The appellant also had extended family 
support, while the respondent had little extended family support. 
(Tr. p. 48, 49, 52, 60. 117). 
Additionally, Dr. Taylor found the children to be a 
little backwards, socially. They would benefit from exposure to 
other children. (Tr. p. 50) 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court did not apply the proper test in arriving at 
its decision to not modify the decree of divorce. The best 
interests of the children should never have been lost sight of, 
even if the Court subjectively decides that there are no material 
or substantial changes in circumstances. The standard for change 
of circumstances should have been less rigid because the custody 
arrangement was stipulated to, and more importantly was a joint 
legal custody arrangement. 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding there 
was no material and substantial change in circumstances, as 
specified in "Facts" above. When the petition for modification was 
filed, the children had not started school. The children are older 
now and are beginning school. Brandon has speech problems, which 
need to be addressed. The appellant has purchased a home instead 
of living in an apartment. He lives in a residential neighborhood 
with easy access to schools and other children. In any case, he 
has the children almost fifty percent of the time. 
Finally, the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees 
to the respondent because there was not enough evidence introduced 
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to prove that the total income available to the respondent would 
exceed that of the appellant's, and the appellant's petition to 
modify was obviously not a frivolous case meant to harass the 
custodial parent, but was a result of a concerned father who wanted 
to provide a better and safer environment and educational 
opportunities for his children. The Court appointed evaluator 
testified that there were many problems with the children's current 
school and living situation. (Tr. p.49-50) Such stiff sanctions 
should never have been imposed on a valid petition requesting 
relief according to provisions of Utah law. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT DID NOT APPLY THE PROPER TEST IN ARRIVING 
AT ITS DECISION TO NOT MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Section 30-3-10.4 Utah Code Annotated, (1984) provides 
the basis for how the original custody award can be modified or 
terminated: 
"(l)(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both 
custodians have materially and substantially changed since the 
entry of the order to be modified... 
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(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the 
decree would be an improvement for and in the best interest of the 
child." 
Case law on change of custody has evolved. Initially as 
in Hogge v. Hoqqe, 649 P. 2d 51 (Utah, 19 82); Becker v. Becker, 
694 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1984 at 611), the basis of changing custody is 
a two tier process. Hogge held that a parent seeking a change in 
custody of a child must first establish that there had been a 
substantial and material change in circumstances upon which the 
original custody award was based, and second that a change in 
custody was in the best interests of the child. This has been 
modified and somewhat eclipsed. 
In Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P. 2d 624 (Utah 1987), Robert 
and Angie Kramer were divorced May 12, 19 82; they stipulated 
custody to Angie Kramer. In 1983 Robert filed a petition for 
modification. Robert had attained advanced degrees in psychology 
and had become employed as director of Salt Lake County Artec 
Program. He had a new home and substantially increased income. 
He and his new wife had a new baby and they had both worked at 
forming a good relationship with Jason Kramer. Robert Kramer 
alleged that Angie Kramer's new husband physically abused her. He 
also alleged that she was an alcoholic, that she was suffering from 
a narcissistic personality, and that she created animosity between 
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Jason and himself. Additionally, Angie Kramer refused to obtain 
treatment for Jason's speech defects. Robert Kramer alleged that 
Jason was unwashed and unkempt when he came to his home for 
visitation. 
The facts are close to the present case. The appellant, 
Douglas Crouse, alleged that the minor children were physically 
unkempt, smelling like diesel fuel, as well as being unwashed. (Tr. 
p. 15) Brandon also has a speech impediment, which needs 
treatment. (Tr. p. 16, 49). The living conditions for the minor 
children were also precarious living in a metal warehouse (Tr. p. 
12-17) with a yard full of heavy equipment and diesel tanks and 
sharp metal pieces disposed randomly in the yard. (Tr. 10, 45) The 
respondent's home was dusty and cluttered. (Tr. p. 18, 45) 
Justice Stewart, Associate Chief Justice, in his 
concurring opinion in Kramer, expressed his concern that such 
strict adherence to the change-of-circumstance rule* may not really 
work for the best interests of the child. He pointed out that it 
is harmful to "preserve stability in a parent-chiLd relationship 
that is destructive" and that a court should not ignore "how well 
the child is doing under the established custodial relationship as 
it has developed over time." (Kramer, at p. 628). 
Justice Stewart, reasoned that "No good can come from 
preserving stability in a parent-child relationship that is 
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destructive, especially when another parent might have a positive 
influence on the child. The nature of the parent-child 
relationship may never be discovered by the trial judge if he or 
she rigidly limits a hearing for change in custody to determining 
whether there are changed circumstances, without any regard for how 
well the child is doing under the established custody relationship. 
Focusing only on the alleged changed circumstances of one or the 
-other of the parents may result in great harm to a child. That 
does not mean that a change of custody should be made when it is 
shown that one parent is only marginally better than another, but 
it does mean that a trial judge should not focus exclusively on 
factors apart from the best interests of the child and ignore all 
evidence pertaining to the child's welfare in a hearing on changed 
circumstances." (Ibid, at page 628-629, Stewart, Associate Chief 
Justice concurring in the result). 
Justice Stewart went on to say, "I fear that this court's 
strong emphasis on stability is reaching the point where it has 
been inappropriately severed from the underlying reason that 
supports the very principle of stability itself, i.e., the need to 
ensure that custody awards are in the best interests of the 
children involved." (Ibid, p. 6 29). 
Justice Howe also wrote that there are other 
circumstances where the child's best interests would be served by 
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looking at a change of circumstances of the noncustodial parent. 
For example, the Court may make a finding that both parties in a 
custody contest are only marginally fit and proper. "The court is 
given a hard choice and picks 'the lesser of the two evils'. 
Later, the circumstances of the noncustodial parent improve. He 
or she may remarry and enjoy a stable relationship, bad personal 
habits may be over come and financial conditions improve. A 
'turnaround' may be made in his or her life. In such an instance, 
a trial court should not turn a deaf ear to these changes and allow 
the child to remain in a home where the custodial parent remained 
marginal." (Ibid. Justice Howe concurring in the result.) 
"A child should not be subjected to spending the rest of 
his or her minority in an inferior environment because of the 
inaction of one parent at the time custody is awarded. Many people 
at the time of their divorce are at a low ebb in their lives. 
Finances are strained, and emotions run high. Many are so 
discouraged that they seek the easy way out. Rules on custody 
should not be adopted which are so inflexible that they do not make 
allowance for these unfortunate realities. 
"The best interests of the child should never be lost 
sight of, and rules on change in custody should not be so rigid 
that this principle is not followed." (Ibid.) 
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The court in Crouse refused to consider the appellant's 
improved conditions. It would not consider the changed 
circumstances of the children, their age, or school experience. 
The court lost sight of the 'best interest' of the children, 
disregarding the evaluation performed. 
Moody vs. Moody, 715 P. 2d 507 (Utah 1985) is another 
case which alters the standard set in Hogqe to fit joint custody 
arrangements. In Moody the physical custody of the minor children 
were changed to the father after a petition to modify. Justice 
Zimmermann, concurring in the result, argued that the proper basis 
for affirming this finding was centered around the joint custody 
status. He stated that the unique fact that the custody 
arrangement was joint custody was of central importance in 
determining the re-opening of the case. 
He said, "The stability-of-placement consideration that 
is central to the strict re-opening standards of Hoqqe and Becker 
appears to be of minimal importance... A measure of instability is 
inherent in a joint custody order because it requires that two 
people, who are not residing together, share custodial rights and 
responsibilities." (Moody, p. 510) 
Justice Zimmermann went on to say that joint custody 
orders should be more readily opened. 
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In the present case, the trial court refused to consider 
the fact that the matter of custody was stipulated to and never 
fully was heard before the court. The court refused to consider 
the fact that joint custody was of central importance in re-
opening a case, and that joint custody cases should more readily 
be re-opened. The trial court refused to consider the expert 
testimony of Dr. Taylor, who said the best interest of the children 
would be better served by living with the appellant in Magna, Utah. 
The court refused to consider the best interests of the children 
regarding health, schooling, neighborhood, or extended family 
environment. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING 
THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE ENTRY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
The court in Crouse refused to consider the changed 
circumstances of the appellant. It focused on material changes of 
the respondent's situation only. The appellant's situation 
improved. The respondent' situation remained more static. The 
court inapproprioately maintained a rigid standard of changed 
circumstances for the custodial parent only. 
Another case which distinguishes the Hogge standard and 
applies to the case at bar is Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P. 2d 
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1248, 1253 (Utah 1987) where the court found that Findings of Fact 
are clearly erroneous if it can be shown that they are against the 
clear weight of evidence that a mistake has been made. In the 
present case, the evaluator felt a custody mistake had been made 
and determined that Mr. Crouse would be the preferred custodial 
parent. So in Crouse, adherence to the rigid changed circumstance 
standard was inappropriate. 
The central premise of child custody cases has been the 
view that stable custody arrangements are of critical importance 
for the child's development. The two part Hoqge test is founded 
upon that premise. When a trial court is asked to determine 
whether there has been a change of circumstances sufficient to 
reopen a custody decree, it focused on whether there has been a 
material change of circumstances. This standard should not be 
rigid, as suggested in Kramer and Moody. Preservation of stability 
which is destructive should not be ignored. The best interests of 
the children are paramount. In Crouse, the court admits it would 
not consider the best interests of the children. (Tr. p. 127-128) 
Judge Daniels, a District Court Judge concurring in a 
decision in Moody, said, "the test creates a practical problem at 
the trial level because evidence as to the best interests of the 
child is difficult to separate from evidence regarding change of 
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circumstances. Change of circumstances involves a very narrow 
spectrum of evidence." 
In Mauqhn v. Mauqhn, 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah App. 1989) the 
court expounded reasons for using a less rigid legal standard as 
set forth in Hoqqe. "If...the initial custody award is premised 
on a temporary condition, a choice between marginal custody 
arrangements, a default decree, or similar exceptional criteria, 
the trial court may properly focus its inquiry into the effects on 
the child of the established custodial relationship as it has 
developed over time... This inquiry is necessarily less rigid 
because the trial court has not previously had an opportunity to 
make a thorough examination of the child's best interest..." 
(Mauqhn, p. 160) 
The court went on to say that "under those circumstances, 
the court may accept a greater range of evidence under Hoqqe's 
first prong, regarding the initial custody arrangement, the events 
that have since transpired, and the resulting effects on the 
child." (Ibid.) 
In the instant case the initial custody arrangement was 
based on a stipulated, default decree. The issue of custody was 
never adjudicated prior to the modification hearing. The court 
would not inquire into the relationships or circumstances which had 
developed over time. 
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In addition there were exceptional criteria in that the 
Crouse custody arrangement was joint custody. Though, physical 
custody of the children had been assigned to the respondent, the 
children had lived approximately equal time in both the 
respondent's home and the appellant's home. As the Moody court 
specified a joint custody arrangement carries more weight in re-
opening the custody question, therefore, the change of circumstance 
requirement should not be as rigid. 
In Crouse; a new custody evaluation was performed which 
indicated that physical custody should be placed with the 
plaintiff. This hearing was of the first instance as to the 
custody question and the court refused to consider the findings of 
the new custody evaluation or the other extensive evidence as to 
the best interests of the children. 
In Kramer, the noncustodial parent sought custody by 
comparing his new marriage as a stable environment to the allegedly 
unsuitable environment maintained by the mother. This was also 
alleged in Crouse. 
As stated above, Justice Stewart proposed that the 
preservation of stability in a destructive parent-child 
relationship could ultimately be more detrimental to the interests 
of the child. (Ibid. at p. 6 28, Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion in the result.) 
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The Hoqqe standard would work against the best interests 
of the child in certain situations such as: 
1. Where custody is originally grounded in the 
temporary incapacity of one parent; and 
2. Where custody is obtained by default divorce. 
At the time of the original divorce decree in Crouse, the 
plaintiff had no facility in which to care for the two minor 
"children. The instant case applies to the above specified 
conditions. The temporary incapacity to parent on behalf of the 
appellant was remedied after his default divorce by his changed 
living circumstances. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P. 2d 599 
(Utah 1989) emphasized that the court since Becker, may consider 
changes in the noncustodial parent's circumstances and that the 
child's best interests could be considered in the first prong of 
the test. (See Elmer, at 602) The court refused to consider the 
appellant's changed circumstances but focused upon the 
circumstances of the respondent. This was a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
Rigid application of the changed circumstance rule could 
harm the child if a child lives under a custody arrangement in 
which he or she was unable to develop fully their talents, 
faculties, and character. 
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"In short, the stability that the changed circumstance 
rule fosters should be viewed as a means of promoting the ultimate 
objective, the overall best interests of the child." (Ibid. p. 
604) 
Certainly, there was evidence to the appellant's changed 
circumstances. The appellant had moved from a small apartment into 
a house, located in a neighborhood with sidewalks and closely 
situated to the schools. The appellant had also obtained gainful 
employment. The children had resided with the appellant nearly 
half of the time. 
There was evidence of the children's changed 
circumstances. The children had begun school. Brandon has a 
speech impediment that needs to be treated. 
There was also evidence of the respondent's changed 
circumstances. The respondent had had an additional child with her 
common law husband. She had obtained part-time employment. 
In this case, there would be no real upheaval or change 
in stability other than a change of schools, as the children have 
spent approximately equal time in each home. Dr. Gary Taylor, the 
only expert who testified in this case, said that the best 
interests of the children would be served by changing physical 
custody to the appellant. 
23 
The trial court disregarded this evidence and refused to 
look at the expert's evaluation and conclusions. The changed 
circumstance rule in this case should not be so strictly applied. 
The trial court, therefore abused its discretion in finding there 
had not been any material change of circumstances. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO 
DEFENDANT. 
Tally v. Tally, 739 P. 2d 83 (Utah App. 1988) states that 
a fee award must be supported by evidence of the financial need of 
the recipient and the reasonableness of the fee. The trial court 
did not consider the total income available to the respondent. 
Respondent only began a part-time job recently. She is a 
housewife. Her common law husband, however, has provided 
sufficient income for her. 
The appellant alleges that the total income available to 
respondent would exceed that of the appellant's, and therefore 
attorney fees were not indicated. No evidence to the contrary was 
put on the record. 
The petition for modification was not a frivolous 
action. A frivolous appeal was defined as "one without reasonable 
legal or factual basis." (Mauqhn, at p. 162) The "sanction for 
bringing a frivolous appeal is applied only in egregious cases 
lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
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erroneous lower court decisions.'" fPorco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365, 
369 (Utah App. 1988)] "Egregious cases may include those obviously 
without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success... j" Ibid. 
See also Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P. 2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 
App. 1988)] The appellant's petition and appeal are a result of 
a concerned and loving father for the physical safety and well-
being of his children. He is concerned for their education. He 
feels he can provide a better and safer environment for them. 
Material changes had not been made to the respondent's home and 
yard, which, although were not formally recommended by the court, 
were recommended by Kim Peterson in the initial custody evaluation. 
The awarding attorney fees to the respondent was unfair 
and an abuse of judicial discretion. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The best interest of the minor children were clearly not 
considered by this court. The court's refusal to rule on that 
issue because of the change of circumstance standard, was error. 
The circumstances of the children and the appellant have materially 
and substantially changed since the entry of the decree of divorce. 
The standard for change of circumstances should not have been as 
strictly applied because of the stipulated and default custody 
decree and because the custody arrangement was joint legal custody. 
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There were changes of circumstances on the part of all parties 
concerned that are material, and changed physical custody of the 
minor children would be an improvement for and in the best interest 
of the children concerned. The trial court abused its discretion 
by not applying the proper standard and by not finding a 
substantial change in circumstance. The trial court's judgment 
should be reversed. 
The trial court also abused its discretion by awarding 
attorney fees to the respondent without evidence of total income 
available to the respondent and as a punitive measure for bringing 
this action. This action was not a frivolous petition. The award 
of attorney's fees should be reversed. Furthermore, there should 
be no award of attorney's fees for the respondent's appeal. 
DATED this J? day of February, 1991. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
KESLER & RUST 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IX. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT in Case No. 900499-CA was 
sent by United States mail, postage prepaid, this 6 day of 
February, 1991, to the following: 
David S. Dillon 
Attorney for Respondent 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^ ^ W ^ 6 / ^ ^ ^ /77Jc 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984. 
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1984. 
Section 30-3-10.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1984. 
Section 30-3-10.4, Utah Code Annotated, 1984. 
Decree of Divorce 
Petition For Modification of Decree of Divorce 
Order and Judgment 
Excerpts of Transcript 
EXHIBIT "A" 
455 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
flule 10. Form of pleadings. 
(a) Caption; names of parties. Every pleading 
ghall contain a caption setting forth the name of the 
court, the title of the action, the file number, and a 
designation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title 
of the action shall include the names of all the par-
ties, but in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the 
name of the first party on each side with an appropri-
ate indication of other parties. A party whose name is 
not known shall be designated by any name and the 
words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in 
rem unknown parties shall be designated as "all un-
known persons who claim any interest in the subject-
matter of this action." 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All aver-
ments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered 
paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single 
set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be re-
ferred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each 
claim founded upon a separate transaction or occur-
rence and each defense other than denials shall be 
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a sep-
aration facilitates the clear presentation of the m#t- ' 
ters set forth. 
(cl Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements 
in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a differ-
ent part of the same pleading or in another pleading, 
or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a p#rt 
thereof for all purposes. 
(d) Paper used for pleadings; size and style. AH 
pleadings and other papers filed in any action, except 
printed documents or other similar exhibits, shall be 
typewritten on good, white, unglazed paper of letter 
size (8V2" x 11"), with a margin at the top of each page 
of not less than 2 inches and a left hand margin of not 
less than 1 inch. The impression must be on one side 
of the paper only and must be double spaced, except 
for matter customarily single spaced and indented. 
The number of the action shall be inserted on the first 
page of every pleading or other paper filed, and the 
matter appeanng on all pleadings or other papers 
shall be clearly legible. 
The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings 
and other papers filed and may require counsel to 
substitute for any pleadings or other papers not con-
forming to the foregoing requirements, original 
pleadings or other papers prepared in conformity 
with this subdivision. 
(e) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an 
original pleading or paper filed in any action or pro-
ceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or 
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed 
and used in lieu of the original. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1983.) 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and 
other papers; sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 
one attorney of record in his individual name who is 
duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The 
attorney's address also shall be stated. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign his plead-
ing, motion, or other paper and state his address. Ex-
cept when otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the aver-
ments of an answer under oath must be overcome by 
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sus-
tained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the pleader or mov-
ant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his 
answer within 20 days after the service of the sum-
mons is complete unless otherwise expressly provided 
by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve 
an answer thereto within 20 days after the service 
upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after ser-
vice of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the 
court, within 20 days after service of the order, unless 
the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion 
under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, 
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones 
its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within 10 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more defi-
nite statement, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within 10 days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, 
to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of ju-
risdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) in-
sufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable 
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall 
be made before pleading if a further pleading is per-
mitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections 
in a responsive pleading or motion or by further 
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. 
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in 
law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for fail-
ure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are pre-
sented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
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tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated 
by the employment or training of the custodial par-
ent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall 
consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court tha t a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child cus-
tody or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre-
vailing party in that action, if the court determines 
that the petition was without merit and not asserted 
in good faith. 1985 
30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in 
child support order. 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, 
it shall include in the order a provision for withhold-
ing income as a means of collecting child support as 
provided in Chapter 45d, Title 78. 1985 
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sex-
ual abuse — Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request 
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of 
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
either party, the court shall order that an investiga-
tion be conducted by the Division of Family Services 
within the Department of Social Services in accor-
dance with Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A. A final 
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered 
until a report on that investigation is received by the 
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the 
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the 
court's notice and request for an investigation. 1988 
30-3-6. Repealed. 1985 
30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
The decree of divorce becomes absolute on the date 
the register of actions or at the expiration of a period 
of time the court may specifically designate, unless 
an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending 
or the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for 
sufficient cause otherwise orders. The court, upon ap-
plication or on its own motion for good cause shown, 
may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of 
time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to 
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the 
decree. 1985 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dis-
solves their marriage by decree may marry any per-
son other than the spouse from whom the divorce was 
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is 
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affir-
mance of the decree. 1988 
30-3-9. Repealed. 1969 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. 1988 
30*3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined. 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody": 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, 
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, 
where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive author-
ity by the court to one parent to make specific 
decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the 
child except as specified in the order of joint legal 
custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly 
equal periods of physical custody of and access to 
the child to each of the parents, as the best inter-
est of the child often requires that a primary 
physical residence for the child be designated; 
and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying 
one parent as the primary caretaker and one 
home as the primary residence of the child. 1988 
30*3-10.2. Joint legal custody order — Factors 
for court determination — Public as-
sistance. 
(1) There is a rebuttable presumption, subject to 
Subsection (2), that joint legal custody is in the best 
interest of a child. 
(2) The court may order joint legal custody if it 
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— Factors 
Public as-
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(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal 
custody, 
(b) joint legal custody is m the best interest of 
the child and 
(c) both parents appear capable of implement-
ing joint legal custody 
(3) In determining the best interest of a child, the 
court shall consider the following factors 
(a) whether the physical psychological, and 
emotional needs and development of the child 
will benefit from joint legal custody 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first prior-
ity to the welfare of the child and reach shared 
decisions in the child s best interest, 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encour-
aging and accepting a positive relationship be-
tween the child and the other parent, 
(d) whether both parents participated in rais-
ing the child before the filing of the suit, 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of 
the parents, 
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, any 
preference of the child for or against joint legal 
custody, and 
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant 
(4) The determination of the best interest of the 
child shall be by a preponderance of the evidence 
(5) The court shall inform both parties that an or-
der for joint custody may preclude eligibility for pub-
lic assistance in the form of aid to families with de-
pendent children, and that if public assistance is re-
quired for the support of children of the parties at any 
time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the 
order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10 4 
(6) The court may recommend that where possible 
the parties attempt to settle future disputes by a dis-
pute resolution method before seeking enforcement or 
modification of the terms and conditions of the order 
of joint legal custody through litigation, except in 
emergency situations requinng ex parte orders to 
protect the child 1988 
30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order. 
(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide 
terms the court determines appropriate, which may 
include specifying 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, 
until altered by further order of the court, or the 
custodian who has the sole legal right to deter-
mine the residence of the child 
(b) tha t the parents shall exchange informa-
tion concerning the health education, and wel-
fare of the child and where possible confer be-
fore making decisions concerning any of these 
areas 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regard-
ing the child s present and future physical care, 
support and education 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the 
child's attendance at school and other activities, 
his daily routine and his association with 
friends and 
(e) as necessarv the remaining parental rights, 
privileges duties and powers to be exercised by 
the parents solelv concurrently or jointly 
(2) The court shall where possible include in the 
order the terms agreed to between the parties 
(3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed 
by the court order may be exercised by the parent 
having physical custody of the child the majonty of 
the time 
(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians 
does not impair or limit the authonty of the court 
to order support of the child, including payments 
by one custodian to the other 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself is 
not grounds for modifying a support order 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute resolu 
tion procedure the parties agree to use before seeking 
enforcement or modification of the terms and condi-
tions of the order of joint legal custody through litiga-
tion, except m emergency situations requinng ex 
parte orders to protect the child 1988 
30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal 
custodians the court may, after a heanng, modify an 
order that established joint legal custody if 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or 
both custodians have matenally and substan-
tially changed since the entry of the order to be 
modified, or the order has become unworkable or 
inappropnate under existing circumstances, and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions 
of the decree would be an improvement for and in 
the best interest of the child 
(2) (a) The order of joint legal custody is termi-
nated upon the filing of a motion for termination 
by 
d) both parents, or 
(u) one parent, when notice of the motion 
is sent by certified mail to the other parent 
and an affidavit is filed with the motion, in-
dicating the motion has been mailed as re-
quired by this subsection 
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be re-
placed by the court with an order of sole legal 
custody under Section 30-3-10 All related issues, 
including visitation and child support, shall also 
be determined and ordered by the court 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this sec-
tion is filed or answered frivolously and m a manner 
designed to harass the other party, the court shall 
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending 
party 1988 
30-3-10.5. Payments of support, maintenance, 
and alimony. 
Unless the order or decree providing for support, 
maintenance, or alimony under this chapter or Chap-
ter 4, Title 30, provides a different time for payment, 
all monthly payments of support, maintenance, or ali-
mony provided for in the order or decree shall be due 
one-half by the 5th day of each month, and the re-
maining one-half by the 20th day of that month 1985 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order 
— J u d g m e n t 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal 
support under any child support order, as defined by 
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it 
is due 
(a) a judgment with the same a t tnbutes and 
effect of any judgment of a distnct court, except 
as provided in Subsection (2) 
(b) entitled as a judgment to full faith and 
credit in this and m any other junsdiction, and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by 
this or any other junsdiction, except as provided 
in Subsection (2) 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a 
child support order may be modified with respect to 
any penod during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but onlv from the date nntir* nf fViaf nahfiA-
EXHIBIT "E" 
(MARTIN J. PEZELY 
Plaintiff 
23 Maple St. 
iMidvale Utah 84047 
JAttorney for the l i tiff , /il£ /) J93u 
|Phone; 255-1261 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
[DOUGLAS R. CROUSE 
P l a i n t i f f 
Iv. 
(AUDREY CROUSE 
Defendant 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 87-1259 
THIS matter came on regularly to be heard before the Commissioner Sandra 
Peuler, Judge Pro-tern of the above-entitled Court on the 2nd day of May, 1988 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and was repre-
sented by counsel, Martin J. Pezely, and the Defendant did not appear in person 
or by counsel; however, the parties and their counsel had earlier appeared 
before Commissioner Sandra Peuler wherein the parties had entered into a 
stipulation concerning the terms of this matter and wherein the Defendant 
agreed to withdraw her Answer and allow the Plaintiff to proceed to take the 
divorce based upon the terms of said stipulation. That more than 
ninety (90) days have expired since the filing of this action. The Plaintiff 
was sworn and testified in support of the allegations contained in his 
Complaint. Based thereupon and upon the Court's being fully advised in the 
premised and upon motion of counsel for Plaintiff, Martin J. Pezely, and the 
Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, and that 
the Decree of Divorce shall be become final upon being signed by the Court 
and entered by the Clerk of the Court• 
2. That joint custody of the minor children is awarded to the parties 
[but said children shall reside with and be maintained by the Defendant subject 
to the Plaintiff's rights of reasonable visitations until they start school 
land the Plaintiff shall have visitation of 10 days each month and 6 weeks each 
summer. During school years: every other weekend from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 
7:00 P.M. Sunday: every other major holiday; one-half day on Christmas; and 
Christmas Holiday; Father's day; and childrens birthdays on alternate years; 
land six weeks each summer. That Plaintiff shall give Defendant 24 hours prior 
notice if he intends to cancel any of the above visits. 
3. That Plaintiff will maintain a policy of health and accident insurance 
for the benefit of the minor children as such is available through Plaintiff's 
place of employment. 
4. That each party will assume and pay their individual Court costs and 
attorney fees incurred in this action holding the other harmless therfrom. 
5. That Plaintiff shall continue to provide Defendant with material and 
financial support as he did during the period the parties were separated 
prior to this action as based upon his current income. 
6. That the Plaintiff will pay no sums as alimony to Defendant. 
7. That the furniture, fixtures, household goods and appliances of the 
parties shall be divided between the parties as is presently in their 
I possession and the Plaintiff is awarded the 1970 Chevrolet Citation vehicle. 
8. That each party is awarded their individual personal effects. 
9. That Plaintiff shall return to the Defendant a doll, crocket dress and 
twin size bed. 
10. That Plaintiff shall not be obligated to provide any type of support 
for the child born during the separation of the parties. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
BY THE COURT: 
SANDRA PEULER 
JUDGE PRO-TEM 
EXHIBIT " F " 
KATHLEEN MCCONKIE (397 8) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-933 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS R. CROUSE, : 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
AUDREY CROUSE, : 
Defendant. : 
: PETITION TO MODIFY 
: DECREE OF DIVORCE 
: Judge 
: Civil No. D-87-1259 
COMES NOW Douglas R. Crouse, the Petitioner in the above-
entitled action by and through his attorney, Kathleen McConkie of 
KESLER AND RUST, and respectfully petitions this Honorable court 
and represents as follows: 
1. The petitioner, Douglas R. Crouse, is the plaintiff in 
the above-entitled matter in which a Divorce Decree was granted 
on or about the 1st day of June, 1987, in Salt Lake City, Utah* 
2. There have been two children born of the marriage of the 
parties, to wit: Tosha R. Crouse, birthdate: June 26, 1984, and 
Brandon D. Crouse, birthdate: September 9, 1985. 
3. Pursuant to the Divorce Decree, the plaintiff and 
defendant were awarded joint custody of the parties' minor 
children, but that they should reside with and be primarily cared 
for by the defendant subject to the plaintiff's rights of 
reasonable visitation. Until the children start school plaintiff 
should have visitations of 10 days a month and 6 weeks each 
summer. 
4. Since the time of the Decree was entered, there have 
been substantial changes of circumstances between the parties. 
These changes merit an alteration in the physical custody 
arrangement on the basis of the best interest of the minor 
children herein. 
(a) The plaintiff has purchased a home. The home has 
three bedrooms, grass in the yard, sidewalks, and neighbors. (See 
Exhibit B of affidavit. The pictures were taken in May of 1989.) 
(b) The plaintiff has exercised his visitation rights 
consistently and has seen the children an even greater amount of 
time than was ordered by the court. The children are actually 
residing with him for nearly six months of the year. 
(c) There are very grave concerns about the children's 
living conditions with their mother, the defendant. The house 
they live in is located in a remote area in Scofield, Utah, about 
30 miles between Helper and Price, Utah. The house is an old 
metal warehouse, which is messy and dirty and smells of diesel. 
It is drafty, and the children often have colds. There is no 
grass in the yard. There is big heavy equipment around the yard. 
The main highway is fairly close to southeast side of the 
building. There are two live rails where coal is shipped on the 
northwest side. The swing set for the children to play on, which 
used to be by the gas pumps, is now close to the highway. There 
is no fenced area for play for the children. The highway is 
congested with heavy equipment which generally transports coal. 
Additionally, there are many cars as a result of the tourist 
trade for the Scofield Reservoir. (See Exhibit A. The pictures 
were taken April 30, 1<J89 at 3:30 p.m.) 
(d). The defendant has not followed through with the 
recommendations of Kim Peterson, the custody evaluator, to make 
some changes in the living arrangements at the home to make the 
home more suitable for children. Grass still has not been 
planted as recommended. Although the swing sets were moved away 
from the gas pumps, their location by the highway is precarious 
for young children. There has been no fence has been erected. 
It was also recommended that the children's upstairs bedrooms 
should have outside access so that they would not have to enter 
by means of the downstairs shop. This has not been performed. 
(e) In addition to the concerns about the health and 
safety of the children, there are also concerns about the lack of 
educational advantages. Tosha, age 4 1/2 has been enrolled in 
pre-school, but because of the severity of the winter, the bad 
roads, or lack of a vehicle, she has attended irregularly. 
Brandon Douglas, age 3 1/2, has speech problems. The defendant 
does not think it is a problem that needs to be dealt with, and 
therefore Brandon has had no opportunity for speech therapy. 
5. The Petitioner feels that he could provide the children 
a better and safer environment with more educational 
opportunities, than is presently being provided by the Plaintiff. 
6. Wherefore it is in the best interest of the children to 
change the physical custody to the Petitioner. 
7. Petitioner has never been awarded the title of his 
pick-up truck as ordered by the Divorce Decree and requests 
sanctions against the Plaintiff because of her continual refusal 
to abide by an order of this court. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Douglas A. Crouse prays judgment on 
his petition as follows: 
1. That the Decree of Divorce granted in June, 1987, be 
modified by changing the custody arrangements of the minor 
children born of the marriage, allowing the plaintiff Douglas A. 
Crouse to have physical custody of the minor children. 
2. For sanctions against Plaintiff because of her 
unwillingness to return the title of the pick-up truck to the 
Defendant as previously ordered by the court. 
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this /5"~ day of Q ^ c ^ u g J 1989. 
KATHLEEN McCONKIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
drcrouse.pet 
KATHLEEN MCCONKIE (3978) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-933 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS R. CROUS E, : 
Plaintiff, ! 
V S . i 
AUDREY CROUSE, i 
Defendant. 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
i DOUGLAS CROUSE 
: Judge 
: Civil No. D-87-1259 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
DOUGLAS R. CROUSE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter in 
which a Divorce Decree was granted on or about the 1st day of 
June, 1987, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. There have been two children born of the marriage of the 
parties, to wit: Tosha R. Grouse, birthdate: June 20, 1984, and 
Brandon D. Crouse, birthdate: September 9, 1986. 
3. The Divorce Decree granted that the parties should have 
the joint custody of said children, but that they should reside 
-1-
with and be primarily cared for by the defendant subject to the 
Plaintiff's rights of reasonable visitation. Until they start 
school plaintiff should have visitations of 10 days a month and 6 
weeks each summer, 
4. I have exercised my visitation rights with my children 
and have even had more time with them than was granted to me by 
the court. 
5. I have some very grave concerns about their living 
conditions with their mother, the defendant, 
6. The house they live in is located in a remote area in 
Scholfield, Utah, about 30 miles between Helper and Price, Utah. 
7. The house is an old metal warehouse, which is built on 
the end of Doug Trease's shop. Doug Trease is the defendant's 
first husband, to whom she was married prior to my marriage to 
her, and with whom she is now living. The house is messy and 
dirty and smells of diesel. It is drafty, and the children often 
have colds. There is no grass in the yard. There is big heavy 
equipment around the yard. The main highway is fairly close to 
southeast side of the building. There are two live rails where 
coal is shipped on the northwest side. The swing set for the 
children to play on, which used to be by the gas pumps, is now 
close to the highway. There is no fenced area for play for the 
children. Pictures are attached as Exhibit "A". 
-2-
8. The defendant has not followed through with the 
recommendations of Kim Peterson, the custody evaluator, to make 
some changes in the living arrangements at the home to make the 
home more suitable for children. Grass still has not been 
planted. Though the swing sets were moved away from the gas 
pumps, their location by the highway is not much better, and no 
fence has been erected. It was also recommended that the 
children's upstairs bedrooms should have outside access so that 
they would not have to go through the shop to get up there. This 
has not been done. 
9. I have concerns about the health and safety of my 
children. I also have concerns about the lack of educational 
advantages. Tosha has been enrolled in pre-school, but because 
of the severity of the winter, the bad roads, or lack of a 
vehicle, she has attended irregularly. 
10. Brandon Douglas, age 4, has speech problems. The 
defendant does not think it is a problem that needs to be dealt 
with, but I do. 
11. I feel that I could provide the children a better and 
safer environment. I own a home in Magna which has 3 bedrooms. 
There is grass in the yard. It is located a block from school. 
12. I am employed at the Bureau of Reclamation at the 
Federal Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, and am currently on a 
-3-
committee to attain day care right in the building where I am 
employed. The children could eat lunch with me on a daily 
basis. 
13- Because the custody awarded is joint custody, I am 
requesting that the physical custody of the children be changed 
from the defendant's to mine. I believe that the children would 
be better off with me and that they would have a safer 
environment and more educational opportunities in my home. 
14. I have not remarried, but I feel I can offer them a 
loving environment. I enjoy spending time with them and being 
involved in teaching them their ABC's and counting. I have also 
provided them with clothing and medical care. The children enjoy 
me, and I enjoy them, and I believe that they would be happy to 
be with me. 
15. The foregoing statements are true and accurate to the 
best of affiant's knowledge and information. 
16. Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this /3 day of _ AfiJlLJ , 1989. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The f o r e g o i n g ins trument was acknowledged b e f o r e 
m e f m A J ^ l i A P W / / ) / f t t h i 3 j ^ d a y of dfiA('£ / 1989 by 
Douglas A. Crouse , t h e p l a i n t i f f of t h e above m a t t e r . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN b e f o r e me t h i s /3**" day of 
189. 
NOTARY PUBLIC , J / ^ 
R e s i d i n g a t Rgjjh XrtJZ'. (fj 
d:crouse.aff 
- 5 -
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defedant 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0726 
(801) 586-4404 
AUG 3 0 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS R. CROUSE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AUDREY CROUSE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. D-87-1259 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came 
on regularly for trial on Friday, July 27, 1990, at the hour of 
10:00 a.m. Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, 
Kathleen McConkie. Defendant was present and was represented by 
counsel, Colin R. Winchester. The Court interviewed the parties1 
two minor children in chambers. Both sides then presented 
evidence and argued the merits. The Court, having interviewed 
the children, having heard the evidence and reviewed the 
documentation, having heard the arguments of counsel, being fully 
advised in the premises, and having previously entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is now therefore 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
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1. No material and substantial change of circumstances has 
occurred since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. Based on the 
lack of such a change, this Court cannot consider the best 
interests of the parties' minor children. 
2. Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce is 
denied. 
3. Defendant is awarded a judgment against Plaintiff in the 
amount of $2,500.00 for her costs of court and attorneys' fees. 
However, Defendant is stayed from executing on that judgment so 
long as Plaintiff pays Defendant at least $100.00 per month in 
satisfaction of that judgment by the last day of each month 
beginning in August 1990. 
DATED this 3.0 day of August, 1990. 
BY THEACQURT: 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTKJJP *" 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KESLER & RUST 
;ATHLEEN MCCONKIE KA1 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CHAMBERLAIN 
& H1GBEE 
VTTORNEYS AT LAW 
2 9 0 SOUTH MAIN 
P. O. BOX 726 
CEDAR CITY, 
UTAH 8 4 7 2 0 
(801) 586-4404 
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vMBERLAIN 
HIGBEE 
RNEYS AT LAW 
SOUTH MAIN 
O. BOX 726 
SDAR CITY, 
TAH 84720 
I ) S86-4404 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT to Kathleen McConkie at 
KESLER & RUST, 2000 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by first class mail, postage fully 
prepaid on this /&J: day of August, 1990. 
// 
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Secretary 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
DOUGLAS R. CROUSE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
AUDREY CROUSE, 
mY 
Case No. 874901259 DA 
CUSTODY HEARING, 7-27-90 
Defend ants 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of 
July, 1990, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came on 
for custody hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH 
RIGTRUP, District Court, without a jury in the Salt 
Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
KATHLEEN MC CONKIE 
Attorney at Law 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney at Law 
CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
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Q. Mr. Crouse, you are aware that we are 
here today because we are trying to modify the custody 
arrangement? 
A. Yes, very aware. 
Q. So, I'm going to ask you some questions 
that will have to do with that. 
A. Okay. 
Q. That arrangement. 
If, in fact, you were able to have the 
physical custody of the children, would you describe 
where they would reside in your home? 
A. I own a brick and siding, rambler home 
in a subdivision. 
Q. 
located? 
Where is that brick, rambler home 
A. 3179 South Patrick Drive, Magna, Utah 
Q. Would you describe the home for us? 
A. It's got two bedrooms upstairs, one 
bedroom downstairs. It has the basic -- there's a 
thousand-square feet each floor. It has a carport. 
It's finished, fenced. It's a regular little 
community. 
Q. Could you tell us about the yard? 
A. It's all in grass, in flowers; the 
entire backyard is fenced. I have fruit trees all 
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along the back side. I have several pine trees on th< 
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south side. 
Q. Would you describe for the Court your 
ne ig hborhood? 
A. Very -- a lot of children. The school's 
within a block and a half of my residence; and so, 
it's mostly family oriented. There probably isn't an 
apartment complex within, geez, probably a half a 
mile. It is mostly residential homes. 
Q. When the children are not with you, do 
you live alone? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So, you are not married now? 
No, I am not. 
Could you give us the name of the 
elementary school? 
A. I believe it is Pioneer Valley. 
Q. Do you have any idea how the elementary 
school is? 
A. As far as the structure, number of 
students? I'm sure there are two or three hundred 
children attending the school. It is kindergarten 
through the sixth grade. The junior high is within 
about five blocks, and right across the street from 
the junior high is the high school. 
8 D. CRODSE WIT PET D 
1 have worked out with her, what has --
2 A, Okay. In the beginning, the Court 
3 awarded me ten days a month six weeks in the summer, 
4 every other holiday and every other birthday, 
5 Well, Audrey was liberal about letting 
6 me see the children. So, as often I could, I had 
7 them, and kept them for weeks on a time. Once she 
8 started kindergarten, I went to every other weekend, 
9 and in some instances, they'd have like summer break 
10 or spring break and Christmas -- over the Christmas 
11 Holidays, I'd have them every day that she didn't 
12 attend school. And so far this summer, I've had them 
13 since May 25th to the 24th of June. She had them from 
14 the 24th of June until the 2nd of July, and I've had 
15 them s ince. 
16 I will comment that --
17 THE COURT: Where after June 24th? 
18 THE WITNESS: Pardon me? 
19 THE COURT: Where after June 24th? 
20 MS. MC CONKIE: You've had them since 
21 June 24th, is that your testimony? 
22 THE COURT: His testimony --
23 THE WITNESS: No. May 25th to June 
24 24th. We had a birthday party for Tosha. Audrey took 
25 1 the c h i l d r e n hhP 0 & +- h *• fc a *• A *«» -~^ w_~.,~vi- ^ - _ i .-
1 to me the 2nd of July, and I've had them since. 
2 MS. MC CONKIE: Okay. Thank you. I'm 
3 glad you clarified that for us. 
4 Now, how are the children given to you? 
5 How did you get the children? 
6 A. Every time I have received these 
7 children, they smell of diesel and grease. I 
8 immediately take their clothes, take them down to the 
9 Laundromat and bathe them. 
10 Q. But, how -- physically how? 
11 A. Their hair is not washed. Their hair 
12 has been -- oh, there's been two or three occasions 
13 that Tosha's hair has been done. 
14 Q. Actually, I guess you are 
15 misunderstanding the question. I'm not talking about 
16 their appearance. How do you physically get them from 
17 Scofield? 
18 A. Oh, I go up there and get them. 
19 Q. Have the children ever been brought to 
20 you? 
21 A. There have been, I would say, maybe 
22 three or four instances where she had either met me 
23 halfway or brought them to me. 
24 Q. How many times would you say you've 
25 driven to Magna to pick up the kids? 
14 D. CRODSE WIT PET D 
A. To Scofield? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Scofield, excuse me. 
A. I would say, there and return, at least 
a hundred times. 
Q. And it is your testimony that you find 
the children in bad shape when --
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
When you receive them? 
Yes. 
Q. Could you explain? 
A. Well, their clothes smell of diesel, of 
grease. There are times when I feel like they haven't 
bathed in several days. In fact, most of time when I 
get them I take their clothes, like I said, and 
immediately throw them down the laundry chute. 
Physically, they are just a mess. In fact, there has 
been one occasion where I couldn't imagine anybody 
being that filthy; but, you know, kids will be kids to 
some degree. 
Q. Mr. Crouse, could you explain to the 
Court the type of discipline that you customarily use 
with the children? 
A. Okay. The way I work it is kind of like 
baseball game. What I do is verbally warn them three 
times about an incident. And I have corrected my 
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children physically by spanking them on the butt; and, 
you know -- they have to learn right from wrong. 
Q. Do you believe in yelling? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have a religious preference, 
Mr. Crouse? 
A. Yes. I'm LDS. 
Q. Do you believe that the children should 
have religious training? 
A. Yes. 
d rugs? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Do you have a problem with alcohol or 
No. 
What is your educational level? 
I'm a high school graduate. 
Do any of your children have any 
physical or emotional handicap? 
A. My little boy has a speech impediment, 
and probably needs some -- either some physical 
therapy or some counseling of some nature. I don't 
know if it's derived from emotions, or what the case 
may be. But -- I find that when -- after he's 
arrived, and he's somewhat settled in, his speech 
seems to improve. 
Q. Now, is it true that you are the person 
16 D. CROUSE WIT PET D 
1 who brought this action before this Court? 
2 A, Yes, it is. 
3 Q. Could you tell the Court why you felt it 
4 was necessary to --
5 A. I feel like --
6 THE COURT: You have got to let her 
7 complete her question. 
8 MS. MC CONKIE: Could you tell the Court 
9 why you felt it was necessary to modify the custody 
10 and visitation arrangement? 
11 A. I feel that the living conditions that 
12 Audrey and her husband live in are inadequate to raise 
13 children. They live in a metal warehouse that has 
14 been divided in two, and has -- you know, a sink and a 
15 bathroom and some bedrooms. I feel the compound that 
16 surrounds the entire structure is full of heavy 
17 equipment. It is full of diesel tanks. It is full of 
18 -- it is a grease pit. He works out of the back end 
19 of it. He owns a construction business. 
20 In the beginning, they had a diesel pump 
21 out in front of the house, and I was able to pressure, 
22 to some degree, the -- Audrey and her ex-husband, or 
23 whatever he is, to remove it. It wasnft even locked. 
24 And I was just afraid that the young kids could maybe 
25 get into the diesel. It since, has been removed. 
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1 But, therefs still heavy equipment. And I think she 
2 lives really filthily. I think she's a poor 
3 housekeeper. I think she has poor hygiene. And I 
4 think she reflects that same thing on my children. 
5 Q. Could you tell me if you had any 
6 concerns about the children's physical health? 
7 A. Well, Audrey told me about two years ago 
8 that her second-to-the-oldest son had been accused of 
9 accosting some child in the area of Scofield. I had a 
10 prior incidence with him and his niece in an 
11 observance of Scotty looking at his niece naked. 
12 Upon their finding of this -- Audrey's 
13 mother and sister -- they took this little boy into 
14 the front room, and they continually battered him and 
15 called him a little pervert. 
16 Q. Let me change the direction of this a 
17 little bit. My question really had to do with their 
18 physical health, such as colds? 
19 A. They are continually having colds. I 
20 have to have them seek medical attention. Basically, 
21 every time I get them, we are either going to --
22 either I give them doses of Benadryl, or there have 
23 been times when I've had to take them to the doctor 
24 and have medication administered. 
25 I don't know, about two or three weeks 
18 D. CROUSE WIT PET D 
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ago, her one boy had come down with hepatitis, and so 
I was somewhat concerned about maybe having the 
children vaccinated. And I was also instructed by 
Audrey that they had been vaccinated because they had 
hepatitis; which he derived, from what she told me, 
from a streptococcus infection that had not been taken 
care of. 
Q. Could you tell me if you've been 
concerned about their education? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Very much. 
Tell us why? 
Well, first of all, their mode of 
transportation, from Scofield to the school, is on 
bus, 40 miles one direction. Tosha attended 
kindergarten, which was only a half a day. And then 
the other half of the day, she would have to stay in 
the library because the bus on the route runs once in 
the morning and once in the evening. 
She told me that she had been taking 
Brandon to preschool, which, as I understand it --
Tosha attends kindergarten in Price, and Brandon was 
going to preschool in Helper. And -- but, that 
activity ceased during the winter months, because the 
roads were so bad that, you know, the subjectivity of 
that child to the conditions exceeded his education. 
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1 But, in turn, when I, at the point, had 
2 them, I, both, introduced them into 
3 daycare/pre-school. 
4 Q. Have you been concerned about their 
5 physical safety in school? 
6 A, Very much. 
7 Q. Could you tell the Court why? 
8 A* Well, at one point, Brandon had fallen 
9 and run a piece of metal through his -- now, I think 
10 he did that in school. Ifm not sure. But, there's 
11 heavy equipment that does not operate. It's been 
12 welded on, and it is jagged metal everywhere. Like I 
13 said, there's gas tanks everywhere you can see. It's 
14 just filthily. It is unsafe. There's just too much 
15 activity. It is a construction yard. 
16 Q. When you pick up the children, would it 
17 be your testimony that there is pieces of metal in the 
18 yard? 
19 A. Very much. There's abandoned heavy 
20 equipment that probably hasn't been operated for 20 
21 years, sitting in the back of their place that's — 
22 you know, the children could, play on, if so inclined. 
23 Q. Now, isn't it true that this is the 
24 second — that we've had two evaluations done? 
25 A. Correct. 
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Q. 
A. 
Could you tell us who did the first one? 
K im Peterson. 
Q. Could you tell the Court if you are 
aware -- or were you told that there needed to be some 
changes made in the Scofield residence for the safety 
of the children? 
A. Mr. Martin Peasley, who was my attorney 
at the time, told me -- now, he wouldn't let me read 
it, because he told me it was strictly confidential; 
but, that he could read excerpts from it. He told me 
that he recommended that they put up a fence, plant 
some grass and construct an outside entrance, outside 
to go to the top bedrooms, so that the older children 
would not have to go through the back of the garage to 
go to their bedrooms upstairs. 
Q. And what is located in the back of the 
garage? 
A. It is a door, the entrance to the shop 
that he works on this equipment in. 
Q. What kind of a shop is that? Do you 
have information on that? 
A. I've never been inside of it. All I 
know is, he's got tools and stuff in there, and he 
works on semi's and tractors and stuff in there. 
Q. To your knowledge, do you know if any of 
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A. There had been a fence constructed in 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the front of his place that resembles more of a dog 
run, but it's basic area, footages: It is about eight 
feet -- ten feet wide by 10, 30 feet long. 
Q. Mr. Crouse, when was that fence erected, 
do you know? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Oh, I would say less than a year. 
Was it after you began this lawsuit? 
Yes. 
Q. To your knowledge, have there been any 
other changes made? 
A. Not to my knowledge, no. 
Q. Has there been grass planted? 
A. I don't see evidence of it, but that's 
not to say that they didn't throw out some seed. 
Q. To your knowledge, do you know if 
there's been an outside access to the upstairs' 
bedrooms? 
A. No, I do not believe there is. 
Q. I'm going to show you some pictures, 
which I think you have already viewed. 
A. Yes. I took these pictures. 
Q. Could you tell me when you took those 
pictures, please? 
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1 A. Gee, an exact date, I couldn't tell you; 
2 but, it has been within the last two years. 
3 Q. Could you give the Court an idea of what 
4 are in those pictures? 
5 A. It is a picture of the dwelling that 
6 they reside in, the surrounding compound; the highway 
7 that runs parallel to this building and the railroad 
8 tracks that run perpendicular to the structure within, 
9 I'd say, 200 feet of the front door. 
10 Q. And, Mr. Crouse, why did you take those 
11 pictures? 
12 A. Because, I was very concerned about how 
13 they lived, where they lived. And I knew that in 
14 order to show cause of why, maybe, I had some 
15 concerns, there were people that needed to understand 
16 what we were dealing with. 
17 Q. Could you describe for the Court if you 
18 feel close to your children? 
19 A. Very much. 
20 Q. Would you tell us about your 
21 relationship with Brandon? 
22 A. Brandon is my son. I love him very, 
23 very much. I'm very concerned about him, in his 
24 speech, I would like to see that addressed. I'd like 
25 to involve myself with him in activities like scouting 
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1 Q. And had you visited with the children 
2 during the period of separation on a regular basis? 
3 A. Very much, 
4 Q. Did they have colds occasionally? 
5 A. Every time I got them* I would say 95 
6 percent of the time they did. 
7 Q. And that was the same, prior to the 
8 divorcef as it is now? 
9 A, Well, no, because I had them six months 
10 out of that year before we got divorced. 
11 Q. But, you were aware prior to the time 
12 that you stipulated to the present custody situation, 
13 that they had colds from being in school? 
14 A. Correct. 
15 MR. WINCHESTER: No f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . 
16 ptrarastt-irePTRECT-- EX-AM-I-NA-TIQ-N 
17 BY MS. MC CONKIE: 
18 Q. Just one other quick question, 
19 Mr. Crouse. Did you believe that they would make 
20 those changes when you left the children? 
21 A. Yes. I believed in faith that they 
22 would make the changes. 
23 Q. And were you hopeful that they would 
24 make those changes? 
25 A. Very much. 
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1 Q. Why? 
2 A. Because I wanted them to be in a safe 
3 environment. I don't want to have to be informed one 
4 evening that something has happened. 
5 Q. And because of those changes not being 
6 made, wasn't it your testimony -- did you not testify 
7 just earlier that that was one of the reasons, because 
8 the changes had not been made, that you decided to 
9 bring this action? 
10 A. Correct. 
11 MR. WINCHESTER: No further questions, 
12 Judge. 
13 THE COURT: You may step down. 
14 MS. MC CONKIE: I would like to call 
15 Dr. Gary Taylor, please, to the stand. 
16 GA-RY"TAYLX>R, called as a 
17 witness on behalf of the Petitioner, after having been 
18 duly sworn, testified as follows: 
19 Dl-RECT- -EX-AMl-NA^ION 
20 BY MS. MC CONKIE: 
21 Q. Thank you for coming, Dr. Taylor. Would 
22 you please state your full name for the record? 
23 A. Gary Marvin Taylor. 
24 Q. And where do you reside, Dr. Taylor? 
25 A. In Salt Lake City. 
36 TAYLOR WIT PET D 
1 very good about calling and setting that up, 
2 Q. And when you arrived in Scofield, can 
3 you describe for the Court your impressions of the 
4 physical facility? 
5 A, It was a very smelly place. I thought 
6 it was a warehouse, or a construction site would be a 
7 good description. It was metal; a lot of metal; 
8 large, and lots of machinery around it. You cross the 
9 railroad tracks, and then turn immediately into the 
10 driveway. And the front was fenced. It was covered 
11 with snow, so I don't know whether there was grass 
12 there or not. 
13 Q. You say the fence was going -- was there 
14 fencing around the entire property? 
15 A. No. It is hard to describe. You drive 
16 in the driveway, and the fence lines the driveway, and 
17 then it also goes out along the side of the highway 
18 that you come into town on. It's (Indicating) --
19 Q. What was your impression of the home 
20 when you got into the home, the physical facility 
21 inside? Would you describe the outside? What was it 
22 like on the inside of the home? 
23 A. Windows were covered with Visquene. It 
24 had been stapled up. The furniture was tattered and 
25 torn. The carpeting was dirty. Not just a little 
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1 bit# but quite dirty and worn. There was a television 
2 in the living room. The children's rooms were mostly 
3 -- not covered with beds, but mostly -- you know, just 
4 beds and dressers. I think the general appearance is 
5 that it is run down. And the walls are scratched. 
6 They are gouged. The floors are needing replacement. 
7 I think dirty is a fair way to describe it. It is 
8 cluttered. 
9 Q. Do you recall if the inside was 
10 adequately heated? 
11 A. I think so, yes. 
12 Q. Did you have any concern because of the 
13 outside description that you've given us, and the 
14 inside description of the physical facility? Did you 
15 have any concerns for the children's welfare? 
16 A. Yes, I did . 
17 Q. Could you explain to the Court why? 
18 A. It is like living in a construction 
19 yard. And I'm sure that there's a certain amount of 
20 danger with that kind of machinery, the shop being so 
21 close. The boys have a bedroom upstairs that you have 
22 to go out -- go out into the shop, and then you climb 
23 the stairs into the back bedroom. Kind of depends on 
24 your standards. 
25 I think that -- the children are really 
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quite small, and I think that they are learning to 
take care of themselves. 
Q. Could you describe for the Court how the 
children appeared to you, physically, when you made 
that trip to Scofield? 
A. Tosha and the older boy just got back 
from school, and they looked like regular school kids; 
just what you would expect as far as cleanliness or 
adequate clothing. They had coats, and things like 
that. The little baby was also adequately dressed. 
Q. Did they seem clean? 
A. Yes, I'd say so. If anything, I would 
-- it looks like the clothing is old. Certainly isn't 
bright and shiny. 
Q. Could you also give me an idea of 
whether you had any information as to the possibility 
of child neglect or child abuse? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you tell us about that? 
A. When I first interviewed Doug, he told 
me that he had turned the family in once to the 
Division of Family Services. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Because of his concerns. And then 
Audrey, when I interviewed her, mentioned that there 
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had been an incident where a DFS worker had tried to 
take the children. 
Q. Who had? 
4 A. A Division of Family Services worker 
5 from Price had tried to take the children. Actually 
6 had been there on the premises, and an employee had 
7 stopped them. 
8 Q. Did you have an opportunity to try and 
9 follow up on that? 
10 A. Yes. Yes, I have. I called the 
11 Division of Family Services to see as if there was a 
12 reported case, or cases. I used Tosha's name and 
13 Brandon's name. 
14 Q. Yes. 
15 A. And I have not -- there was also, 
16 supposedly, an accused sex abuse, which by my 
17 profession, Ifm required to investigate; and, that 
18 one, however, was for, I guess, Scott, Scotty. I 
19 called the Division of Family Services on that one to 
20 see if they had a report of sex abuse on Tosha, and 
21 there was none; none reported. 
22 Q. Did you have an opportunity to view the 
23 way the children interacted with Mrs. Crouse? 
24 A. Yes, very much so. 
25 Q. Did you have an opportunity to view the 
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1 way the children acted with Mr. Crouse? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Could you tell the Court your opinion on 
4 their interaction with both parents, such as, for an 
5 example: Are they bonded to both parents? This type 
6 of thing? 
7 A. I would say that they are bonded to both 
8 parents. 
9 Q. In terms of bonding, is that a concern, 
10 or an issue, when you do a child custody evaluation? 
11 A. Very much so, yes. 
12 Q. And would it be your testimony that you 
13 would try and pick up on whether they bond with one 
14 person or another? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And, also, Dr. Taylor, you provided for 
17 the Court a custody evaluation where you discussed 
18 your interviews with Mr. Crouse and Mrs. Crouse and 
19 your feelings about the children. You discussed 
20 background and discipline and description of the 
21 physical facility, all of those things. Do you have 
22 an opinion -- and I believe you've already expressed 
23 an opinion, excuse me, in the evaluation -- as to 
24 where the children would — what would be in the best 
25 interests of the children in terms of their custody 
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and visitation arrangement? 
2 A. Yes, I do. May I say something before 
3 that? 
4 Q. Please, Yes, preface it with what you 
5 would 1 ike? 
6 A. The children love both of the parents, 
7 and it is real obvious that Audrey is a good mother to 
8 the children, and Doug is, too. 
9 My concern then, changed from not 
10 whether Audrey's a good parent or Doug's a good 
11 parent, as to what the children -- what can benefit 
12 the children the most. And I was concerned about 
13 Brandon's speech impediment. I was concerned about --
14 at the time, I thought, well, if there is some danger 
15 towards Tosha, as far as others, a possible sex abuse, 
16 or just being at home -- or not at home, but being at 
17 school all that time, not having anything to do except 
18 be with the librarian -- I know that Doug would be 
19 very likely to give the children the kind of medical 
20 attention that they need. Aside -- these are things 
21 aside from the housing. The housing, in a way, is a 
22 shell. Doug's house is definitely better. It is more 
23 -- it is newer. It's cleaner. It is certainly well 
24 taken care of. And he's very concerned about taking 
25 care of the children and providing for them the best 
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1 that he can, as well as Audrey. I think that Doug has 
2 more resources, and along with his family support. He 
3 has the family backup, the financial, is a better 
4 living environment and the medical attention that the 
5 child ren need. 
6 I'm -- I find them a little backwards, 
7 socially. I think it would be good for them to be 
8 exposed to other children, and to be more social. 
9 Q. When you say you find them a little 
10 backwards, socially, would you explain that to the 
11 Court? 
12 A. They were very difficult to interview 
13 and talk to because they would not either -- either 
14 time, would really not leave the side of the parents. 
15 They were very clingy, and didn't talk much. Just 
16 really very difficult to interview the children. So, 
17 it was mostly watching their behaviors. 
18 Q. As a therapist, and in this evaluation, 
19 did you feel that you were able to connect with the 
20 children? 
21 A. Eventually, when they started 
22 recognizing me. Like, when I went to Scofield, Tosha 
23 did say -- she did recognize me, and she did say to 
24 her mom, "I've seen him before, twice." 
25 Q. Yes. 
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1 A. And then Brandon really loosened up, if 
2 you will. He was showing me how he could drive his 
3 Jeep, and he was trying to talk a lot. 
4 Q. Is it a concern of yours, Dr. Taylor --
5 I mean, do you -- is it something that you try and 
6 determine when you do an evaluation, the bonding 
7 between other siblings in the home? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Could you explain to the Court your 
10 feelings about that? 
11 A. I saw Tosha only interact with her mom, 
12 and I don ft know what that means as far as bonding 
13 with the other boys. I know that her -- that Doug --
14 the other Doug? Doug Trease says that she's the 
15 spoiled one in the family. And all of the boys would 
16 say that. So, I think she probably gets a lot of 
17 attention there. 
18 Brandon, he sort of -- neither Brandon 
19 nor Tosha related a lot to the other boys. But, when 
20 I talked to them, they certainly are aware that those 
21 are brothers, and they are trying to make a family out 
22 of that. 
23 They bonded -- the bonding with the 
24 other family members is probably not as strong as 
25 you'd see in a regular -- not a regular family, but a 
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1 family that has not gone through a divorce. There is 
2 a distinction between the two. 
3 Q. Between kind of a blended family and a 
4 family that has never been blended? 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. Dr. Taylor/ could you describe whether 
7 outside -- an outside, extended-family involvement 
8 with the children is important? Can you give us an 
9 opinion of whether outside involvement with the 
10 children is important? 
11 A. I'm sure that having grandparents 
12 available and associating with them helps establish 
13 roots. 
14 Q. Could you tell me if you have an opinion 
15 regarding both parties1 outside family involvement 
16 with the children? 
17 A. Well, there's very little contact on 
18 Audrey's side, and very extensive contact with Doug's 
19 side. 
20 Q. Was that issue important to you when you 
21 made your opinion to the Court? 
22 A. Yes, it was. I felt that with Doug, he 
23 could also have the family support that he might need 
24 with the children if he had more of the time. 
25 Q. Did you see the children interact with 
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any outside, extended family members? 
A, No. 
Q. Were there any telephone calls? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you tell the Court what that was? 
A. I was doing a home visit at Doug's 
house, and a grandmother called, and probably that's 
the time I heard Tosha talk the most, was when she was 
talking to her grandmother on the phone. 
Q. Did you know which grandmother that was? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. You didn't know whether it was --
A, I think it was Doug's mother, but I'm 
not positive . 
MS. MC CONKIE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may cross. 
eRO^S^EX-AM-rNATI"ON 
BY MR. WINCHESTER: 
Q. Dr. Taylor, I'm a little concerned about 
-- I guess, I'm curious more than anything about these 
contacts with the Department of Family Services. You 
have referenced briefly today some type of allegations 
of sexual abuse as regards Scott. Could you tell the 
Court --
A. Scott. 
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1 Q. I thought it was abuse for Tosha. 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. And have you found that that was not the 
4 case? 
5 A, Right, I did not. It -- the Division of 
6 Family Services in Price said there had been no 
7 reported case against Tosha. 
8 Q. The Scott situation, if you will, is it 
9 your understanding that he was the victim of sexual 
10 abuse, or the perpetrator of some type of sexual 
11 abuse? 
12 A. The perpetrator. 
13 Q. All right. But, not as directed toward 
14 either Brandon or Tosha? 
15 A. Right, that's correct. 
16 Q. Regarding Brandon's speech problem, 
17 specifically what type of problem is that? 
18 A. He stutters. 
19 Q. Do you know whether one parent or the 
20 other has done anything to cure that situation, or to 
21 resolve it somehow? 
22 A. The only -- the only thing that I know 
23 is that Doug asked me about it, what he should do 
24 about it, and I made recommendations that they search 
25 out some speech therapy. 
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going to get the children, and everyone seems to be 
aware of it. 
Q. Based on your perceptions for the few 
hours that you were in Scofield, do the other boys 
treat Tosha and Brandon rudely because they spend so 
much time with their father? Is there any kind of a 
negative aspect of that? 
A. No, I think that they like them. 
Q. Directing your attention to the other 
allegations of abuse or neglect, you referred to one 
where Doug had reported Audrey and Doug Trease. What 
was the outcome of that, if you know? 
A. The report was -- now, this is from 
Doug . 
Q. Okay. 
A. He called them up because he was 
concerned about their safety, called up the Division 
of Family Services, because he was concerned about 
their safety. At the same time that he called them 
up, he was told that there had been other allegations 
other than his. 
Q. 
children? 
A. 
Q. 
Regarding, also, the safety of the 
Yes. 
What I couldn't figure out is whether it 
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them, directly, "Who do you want to live with?" 
Brandon and Tosha were both already emotionally too 
vulnerable to do that, to put them on that -- in that 
kind of a spot. 
Audrey told me that Brandon told her 
that he wanted to stay with his mother. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Doug told me that the children wanted to 
stay with him. So, obviously, it is a judgment call. 
Both parents are good parents to these kids, and so 
therefore, it -- I changed from what the child's 
preference was to what would be best for him or her. 
Q. You didn't directly ask the children? 
A. Right. 
Q. And I take it there was nothing in what 
you observed that gave you some great clue one way or 
the other as to what they preferred? 
A. They are about the same in both houses. 
Although, Brandon's a little more free, if you will, 
to show off and drive around, do his thing. He plays 
a little bit more. 
THE COURT: Where? 
THE WITNESS: At the Scofield house. 
MR. WINCHESTER: I take it that that's 
the incident that you referred to, motorized Jeep, or 
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D -I-R ECT' -BX-AMf-N AT I 0"N 
BY MR. WINCHESTER: 
Q. Mrs. Crouse, would you please state your 
full and current address? 
A. Audrey Crouse. I live at Scofield 
Route, Box 660, Helper, Utah. 
Q. Are you the mother of Tosha and Brandon? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And they are also the children of Doug 
Crouse, is that correct? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. Were you divorced from Doug in June of 
1988? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And since that time, where have you 
res ided? 
A. In Scofield. 
Who have you resided there with? 
My ex-husband, soon to be husband 
And what's his name? 
Doug Trease. 
Is he in the courtroom today? 
Yes, he is. 
Prior to the time that the divorce was 
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again. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
you have stayed home with the children? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Those would include both Brandon and 
Tosha and your children from your prior marriage to 
Mr. Trease? 
A • Yes, they were. 
Q. Do you intend to go back to work outside 
the home at any time in the near future? 
A. I am doing a part-time job as of last 
week, working at a store two to three days a week. 
Q. Where is that store located? 
A. In Scofield. 
Q. And how many minutes is that from the 
house? 
A. Probably three. If you walked, it would 
be three minutes. 
week? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
How many hours per shift do you work? 
Probably four. 
So, four hours, two or three times a 
Yes. 
Q. Do you intend to continue that job? 
A, Probably not when winter gets here. 
They just needed somebody for the summer. 
Q. Who watches the children while you are 
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walk outside our back door that goes into the garage, 
there is steps that go upstairs to my two oldest boys1 
bedrooms. 
Q. 
bedrooms? 
Do Tosha and Brandon use those upstairs 
A. No, they do not. They sleep 
downstairs. I have my three little kids in the 
downstairs' room, but they all have their own bed. 
Q. I am going to show you what's been 
marked for purposes of identification as Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 1. I represent to you that it is 11 
photographs, and ask you if you recognize them? 
A. Yes. I took these pictures the same day 
that Doug Crouse had taken the pictures on the outside 
of the house. When he was taking, I went in 
immediately and took pictures. 
Q. So, these are pictures of the interior 
of your home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Is there also one there of the exterior? 
Yes. 
Does that photograph show the fence? 
Yes, it does. 
Do you know who took that picture? 
I think Doug Trease took that picture. 
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Q. Is it indicative of what the outside of 
2 your home looks like? 
3 A. Yes, it is. Except, off to the side of 
4 the driveway, there is where the heavy equipment 
5 sits. 
6 Q. Thank you. 
7 A. Since then, we have put in new carpet in 
8 the front room. When Gary Taylor, the evaluator, did 
9 show up, yes, my carpet was dirty. But, I get my 
10 carpet cleaned twice a year. I have it done in 
11 November, and then I have it done again on Mother's 
12 Day. 
13 Q. Is it safe to say that dirt gets dragged 
14 into your house simply because of the outside? 
15 A. Because of outside of the house, yes. 
16 Q. Why did Brandon stop going to preschool 
17 last year? 
18 A. For the fact that it was getting too 
19 hard. His teacher said that he is smart enough now to 
20 not put him back in, to let him go through the rest of 
21 the year, teach him at home what you can and then 
22 let's put him in the following year, because we had 
23 the problem with my oldest son getting too much 
24 preschool and then they wanted to move him ahead when 
25 he got to kindergarten instead of letting him start 
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when he should have started. With his birthday being 
as early as it is, they move that date so he has to go 
to school when he turns six. 
year? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
So, he doesn't go to kindergarten? 
He will go to --
And returned to you through the school 
Yes. 
Q. Let me regress for a moment to the issue 
of the interior of the house. There has been some 
talk by Mr. Taylor for the older two boys to get to 
their bedrooms upstairs, they have to go up some 
stairs and back into the house portion of the 
building. Can you describe that area for us? 
A. It is clean. We set our garbage outside 
of the door, and then at the end of I guess a week, we 
take the garbage up to the garbage dump because they 
don't have a garbage man that comes around. But, once 
a week, the garbage does get hauled off to the dump. 
They keep it upstairs cleaned. It's -- they have a 
pool table up there. It's just more or less for my 
older boys. The little kids go up there once in a 
great while to play pool. They will go up in their 
bedroom. 
Q. Is the upstairs carpeted? 
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had threw grass out. It had taken a couple of months 
where the grass would start coming up, because our 
soil up there is bad. 
Q. Do you recall when the diesel pump was 
removed from being near the swing set? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that? 
A. It was done -- probably, it was done 
last summer. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Summer of '89? 
Summer of '89. 
It was done, probably, in March of last 
summer. 
Q. When was the temporary fence put up? 
A. It was put up, probably -- I think it 
was up right before Thanksgiving. 
Q. Of last year? 
A. Yes. Or, I guess -- I don't know. We 
couldn't have dug it then. So, it had to be up before 
that, because it was cold. 
Q. Now, both Mr. Taylor and Mr. Crouse have 
referred to the fact that the building is close to a 
major highway, that the swing set is close to a major 
highway, that the now-fenced area is close to a major 
highway. The picture would so indicate. What kind of 
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our -- carnival. I had to run some more pancake mix 
across the track to the neighbor lady. I had came 
back. I just ran it over. And I came back. I told 
my oldest boy where I was going, and that I would be 
r ight back. 
In the meantime, he was in the house 
playing Nintendo. He thought my second to the oldest 
was watching him. My second to the oldest thought 
that he was watching him. And the welfare lady was 
there. And when I seen her pick my baby up, I came 
running across the tracks, and asked her what she 
thought she was doing. And then she had told me that 
she was taking him because he was walking out to the 
road . 
Q. And I assume that you convinced her not 
to take him? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, I did. 
Was that a heated exchange? 
No, it wasn't. I had just told her that 
-- I had no idea the -- we had had the fence up. He 
did crawl over the fence. The fence had the chicken 
-- because, we had a bigger fence, because it is just 
temporary, we had put chicken wire across it. And my 
oldest boys and Brandon had showed him how to crawl 
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that this morning? 
A. Yes, I did, 
Q. Would you tell the Court what happened? 
A. There was an incident where somebody, 
apparently from Scofield, had called in and said that 
my little boy had apparently had sex with my daughter, 
Tosha. And they wanted him -- I had to go down and 
talk to welfare, or Social Services, about it. And 
then, at that time, they had told me that I was 
leaving my children constantly, that there was this 
sex-role thing with Scott and Tosha and that Doug 
Trease was beating them constantly. 
Q. And what was the result of their 
investig at ion? 
A. Zero. I had Tosha down a couple months 
later. Tosha had had a urinary tract infection. I 
took her down to emergency. We tried to call her dad, 
but he was out of town on business. Doug Crouse was 
out of town on business. And when I -- when they told 
me she had a urinary-tract infection, I had asked the 
doctor if he would please check and see if she had 
ever been touched for the -- and I had told him what 
had went on. And he said, "No, she has not." And 
then I asked him if he would write a letter to the 
Social Services, saying that she has never been 
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and leave him when you work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the other two boys are generally 
playing in the neighborhood? 
A. They go over -- they do let her know 
where they are at. She is in charge of all of them, 
but they don't stay right there at her house. They 
are allowed to go play with their other friends. 
Q. And do you have a financial arrangement 
with her for her to watch the children for you? 
A. All we do is when she works, I watch her 
k ids. 
Q. Have you ever asked her how she -- what 
her philosophy of discipline would be on the children, 
with her children? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Do you have any idea what her philosophy 
of discipline is, then? 
A. I don't -- I've never really asked her. 
I couldn't tell you. 
Q. And but for the fact of that neighbor, 
who is responsible for the children at all other 
times? 
A. 
Q. 
I am. 
So, it would be your testimony that you 
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A. I think we counted the last couple of 
weeks ago, when everybody was up there arguing over 
it, and I think we came up with 86. 
Q. 86. Isn't it true that in addition to 
Mr. Crouse calling the Division of Family Services to 
report you for child neglect, that there have been 
other people that have done that, as well, neighbors 
of yours? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. 
A. 
Do you know who that was? 
He -- that's when the incident had came 
in with Scott, and they had said that it was an 
anonymous phone caller. They did tell me when Doug 
Crouse did call me in, and that was back when we had 
the first evaluation, when he had supposedly called 
the Social Services and turned me in. 
Q. How would you describe yourself as a 
housekeeper, Mrs. Crouse? 
A. My house is cluttered. It is clean, but 
it is cluttered. It is not a house that you can't 
walk in and say, "Well, we got to take our shoes off 
because we might get a little spot of dirt on the 
carpet, or" -- my house does look lived in. 
Q. Now, I believe it was Dr. Taylor's 
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Q. 
A. 
So, other --
I told him that there's no sense in 
bringing her back before we know exactly what -- if 
they are going on strike, or not, because it might --
if they say that they are going on strike, then they 
wouldn't be going on strike on the 10:00 o'clock 
news. So, I just told him: "You can go ahead and 
keep them until we figure out and find out if there is 
a teachers' strike or not." Because, I do believe 
that he needs to spend time with his children. 
Q. As a whole, for the whole school year of 
*89, 1990, approximately, how many days did she miss? 
A. She probably missed seven days. 
Q. Do you, in fact, have some monthly 
income, personal from your work at the store, now? 
A. I haven't got a check from them because, 
like I said, I just started working last week. 
Q. How much per hour do they pay you, do 
you know? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
$4.50 an hour. 
Do you love your children? 
Yes, I love my children. 
All five of them? 
All five of them. 
Do you desire custody to remain as it 
97 A. CROUSE WIT RPT RD 
A. No, not at all. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Now, finally, Mr. Taylor referred this 
morning to some stuttering problems that Brandon has, 
and told us today that he had made some 
recommendations to you. Did you follow up on those? 
A. I -- prior to talking to Mr. Taylor, the 
preschool that he attended, I secured a doctor's name, 
of who I had -- would have him tested by. But, it was 
upon Gary's and the woman that I talked to that --
once I introduced him into therapy, it is something 
that I have to continue. I could not, incidentally, 
ten days a month, send him to therapy, and then send 
him up there. It was something that I'd have to start 
and continue on. So, up until then, I have not 
referred him to it, to therapy. 
Q. If you are awarded the permanent -- not 
-- the sole --
A. The residual --
Q. During the school year, would you in 
fact see that that was done? 
A. Yes, I would. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Thank you. 
No further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MS. MC CONKIE: Just a quick. 
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1 are stable and have moral values and have a proper and 
2 helpful relationship with the children. 
3 My client has testified to the fact that 
4 he has a close, loving relationship with the 
5 children. That he has been involved in their — in 
6 nurturing them, that he takes them to activities, that 
7 he enjoys playing with them. He's testified that he's 
8 free from any type of addictive behavior in terms of 
9 drugs or alcohol, that he has a desire to do what's 
10 best -- in the best interests of the children. 
11 I also believe, Your Honor, that the 
12 custody evaluation was a thorough evaluation by a very 
13 respected member of the professional community in Salt 
14 Lake City who did an in-depth -- who did interviews 
15 with the parties, spent a lot of time; and, I believe 
16 that his testimony and the evidence shows that he was 
17 objective, that he tried to do what was, in his expert 
18 opinion, in the best interests for these children; 
19 that he had concerns, as the evaluation would suggest, 
20 not with bonding of the children to either parent, or 
21 the love that was shown by the parents to the children 
22 -- he didn't seem to have concerns in terms of the 
23 bonding -- but he did have rather serious concerns in 
24 terms of the physical safety of the children. The 
25 expert had concerns regarding the physical safety of 
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1 happened over the last couple of years* 
2 In fact, the visitation has been far 
3 beyond what the Court originally -- or at least what 
4 the stipulation in the decree of divorce provided 
5 for. I think the parties have cooperated. Yes, the 
6 issues apparently have not resolved themselves. But, 
7 if anything, the fence is now in place. The diesel 
8 pump has been moved. And those, as I read Kim 
9 Peterson's evaluation, are the only two 
10 recommendations that are actually made on the last 
11 page of that evaluation. 
12 Kim Peterson also says that there is a 
13 concern about the stairs being out of the shop and so 
14 forth, but not -- coming back to that, does not make 
15 that specific recommendation. They weren't court 
16 orders, and I am not saying that the parties should be 
17 ordered to back-room the best interests of their 
18 children. But, they weren't court orders. They did 
19 take care of them, and, yes, they didn't take care of 
20 them, apparently, to Mr. Crouse's satisfaction until 
21 he filed this petition to modify. But, they've been 
22 cleaned up. 
23 I think the extension of the existing 
24 law should come in here. When a party is represented 
25 by counsel, when there has been a custody evaluation, 
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1 several things, and it gets to be a matter of lack of 
2 choices to some extent; and sometimes judges are 
3 perceived not to be fair when the rule of law, 
4 sometimes, maybe doesn't come up fair. 
5 Judges are certainly not infallible, and 
6 they are not Solomons, because they can't cut the baby 
7 in two. Then the result comes out one way, or the 
8 other. And depending on your perspective, that 
9 sometimes is perceived as unfair. 
10 We've had a series of cases a few years 
11 ago that talked about the need in these kinds of 
12 proceedings to bifurcate them, which wasn't at the 
13 time well-understood by the trial bench, as to how you 
14 sort out grounds from getting over the threshold issue 
15 of material and substantial change of circumstances. 
16 But, in these kinds of proceedings, the Court must 
17 certainly examine the issue of material and 
18 substantial change of circumstances as the threshold 
19 issue. 
20 In this particular case, the Court feels 
21 that the evidence is totally lacking of any 
22 substantial evidence demonstrating any material change 
23 of circumstance. The report of Dr. Taylor focuses on 
24 environment and surroundings and housing to a large 
25 extent, at least on the evaluative portion of the 
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1 report that pertains to Mr. Crouse, and dwells less on 
2 that aspect of it with Mrs. Crouse. The Court has no 
3 evidence of what the apartment was or why the fact 
4 that you are now a fee owner is anymore desirable than 
5 where you lived before; though, it might be inferred 
6 that there might be a more stable situation with 
7 homeowner ship. I don't know that we have any 
8 particular studies that suggest one way or the other, 
9 that somehow homeowners develop better citizens than 
10 renters or those sorts of thing. 
11 The situation was the same, pretty much, 
12 with Mrs. Crouse. She lived at Scofield at the time 
13 you stipulated to the divorce. And other than you 
14 buying a new home, the Court really sees no remarkable 
15 changes. Changes, if any, are the fence, I suppose, 
16 and a little plot of grass and a few minor changes; 
17 though, the Court really doesn't perceive those to be 
18 very significant. 
19 The second thing that the Court has to 
20 consider -- and I don't understand Counsel's comment 
21 exactly, I guess -- that there is no law. I think 
22 there is abundant law, Mr. Winchester, that where 
23 parties agree to something, that the Court is caught 
24 in an inescapable corner to correct what parties do. 
25 So, if you think that you can enter a bargain, and 
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1 joint-custodial position. You still ought to talk 
2 with your wife, and you ought to be active in pursuing 
3 a speech pathology program. And I submit that you 
4 could find one up at the University in a clincial 
5 setting that wouldn't be an arm and a leg to follow 
6 through on• 
7 I think that you need to recognize that 
8 the desires of the children are awfully important, and 
9 not be so concerned about pitting who's going to be 
10 the superior parent. And the kids will let you know 
11 where they feel comfortable and where they feel love 
12 and where they feel nutured and feel secure, 
13 certainly, and there ought to be some weight accorded 
14 to the fact that your wife is generally a full-time 
15 caretaker. And were she the biological parent, that 
16 perhaps ought to receive some consideration as to 
17 farming her out to your parents or brothers and 
18 sisters, and farming out the parental responsibilities 
19 which the mother can provide in a more direct, normal, 
20 full-time basis. 
21 The Court is persuaded that some of that 
22 should have been reasonably clear, and I will award 
23 the Defendant $2,500 for fees and costs. And that 
24 certainly is more than enough of a sanction that Rule 
25 11 would impose. I will allow execution to be stayed 
133 DECISION 
